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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Workmen's Compensation-Latent Injuries and the Period
of Limitations on Filing Claims
When it is undisputed that an industrial accident arising out of and
in the course of employment proximately results in a disabling injury,
and the claim for compensation is filed within a reasonable time after
the disability, few would doubt that an award favorable to the claimant
should issue. Where the injury is latent or progressive, however, and
does not manifest itself until long after the accident, an otherwise
meritorious claim may be denied under a provision like G.S. § 97-24(a)
which forever bars the right to compensation unless a claim is filed with
the Industral Commission within two years after the accident.' In
Whitted v. Palmer-Bee Co.,2 for example, a case involving the old one
year limitation period, the claimant was involved in an apparently trivial
accident and sustained a very slight injury to his right eye by a flying
sliver of metal. The incident was reported to the employer promptly,
but no claim for compensation was made as the employee returned to
the job almost immediately. Some eighteen months later, however, a
cataract developed in the right eye and the claimant totally lost the
sight of the eye. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
employee's failure to file claim within one year after the accident forever
barred his right to compensation.3 In other words, the limitation period
began running on the date of the accident against a claim which had
not at that time matured, and when the claim did mature some eighteen
months later, it was held to be already barred.
A result more in keeping with the remedial purposes of workmen's
compensation legislation is possible, indeed, is usual, where the limitation
period is dated not from the time of the accident, but from the time of
the injury.4  In Hughes v. Industrial Comn'n,5 where the seemingly
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-24(a) (1958) provides: "The right to compensation
under this article shall be forever barred unless a claim be filed with the Industrial
Commission within two years after the accident, and if death results from the
accident, unless a claim be filed with the Commission within one year thereafter."
(The 1955 amendment enlarged the period for filing claims from one to two years.)
2228 N.C. 447, 46 S.E.2d 109 (1948). The Whitted case distinguished
Hardison v. Hampton, 203 N.C. 187, 165 S.E. 355 (1932) which had held that
Form No. 19, to be filed with the Commission by the employer upon the occurrence
or knowledge of an injury, constituted a "claim" within the intendment of G.S.§ 97-24(a). At the time of the Whitted decision, however, Form No. 19 had been
amended and contained a statement on its face that it was filed in compliance
with G.S. § 97-92 only and was not the employee's claim for compensation. See
Lilly v. Belk Bros., 210 N.C. 735, 188 S.E. 319 (1936).
'Accord, Wilson v. Border Queen Kitchen Cabinet Co., 221 Ark. 580, 254
S.W.2d 682 (1953); Gavigan v. Visiting Nurse's Ass'n, 125 Conn. 290, 4 A.2d
923 (1939) ; Rutledge v. Sanders, 181 Kan. 369, 310 P.2d 950 (1957).
'The "accident" contemplated by workmen's compensation legislation is any
untoward event which results in some injury to the workman. It should be pointed
out that in any accident giving rise to a right to workmen's compensation there
will always be some traumatic or "injuring" effect at the precise moment of the
accident although the employee may be unaware of it. It is the premise of this
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trivial accident occurred in December, 1953, it was not until October,
1954 that "traumatic sinovitis, left wrist" was discovered. Claim for
compensation was made more than twenty-one months after the accident.
The Arizona court, while holding the claim timely as against a one
year period of limitation which ran from the time of the injury, said that
the employee could not have been expected to make a claim for com-
pensation at the time of the accident, for the injury was not then com-
pensable, and that consequently the statute of limitations did not begin
to run until the injury became manifest. 6
Summarization of the statutes, in respect to their claim period dates,
is difficult because of considerable variety and rather frequent amend-
ment. However, it appears that of the some fifty workmen's compensa-
tion statutes in effect in this country at least twenty-six clearly date the
claim period from the time of the "accident. ' 7  Most of the remaining
Note, however, that when the injury is latent and its full extent is essentially
unknowable until some time after the accident that produced it, the statute of
limitations should not begin to run until the employee knows or has reason to
know that he suffers from a compensable injury.
81 Ariz. 264, 304 P.2d 1066 (1956).
'Accord, Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 43 Ariz. 50, 29
P.2d 142 (1934) (cancer developed more than two years after the accident);
Acme Body Works v. Koepsel, 204 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 756 (1931) (cataract
resulted more than six years after the accident).7 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 296 (1940) (claim must be filed within one year from
the time of the accident) ; ARx. STAT. § 81-1318 (Supp. 1957) (two years from
the date of the accident; formerly -an from the date of the "injury" but amended
in 1948) ; CAL. LAB. CODE § 5405 (one year from the date of the "injury," but §
5411 defines the date of the "injury" as the date of the "accident") ; COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 81-13-5 (1954) (six months after the injury, but § 81-13-6 provides
that any disability beginning more than five years after the accident is conclusively
presumed not to be due to the accident; the latter section has been held to be a
rule of evidence and not a 'statute of limitations. Industrial Comm'n v. Weaver,
81 Colo. 191, 254 Pac. 444 (1927)); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-168 (1958) (one
year from the date of the accident) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2361 (Supp.
1958) (two years from the accident); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-305 (1956)(one year after the accident); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-402 (1949) (one year
after the date of the accident); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 161 (Smith-Hurd 1950)
(six months after the accident) ; Im. ANN. STAT. § 40-1224 (1952) (two years
after the "occurrence of the accident"; formerly two years after the injury,
but amended in 1947); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-520a (Supp. 1955)(120 days after the accident); Ky. REv. STAT. § 342.185 (1959) (one year
from the date of the accident); ME. Rrv. STAT. ANN. ch. 31, § 33 (Supp. 1957)
(in no event to exceed two years from the date of the accident) ; Mn. ANN.
CODE art. 101, § 39 (1957) (sixty days after the date of the "accidental injury,"
but an amendment in 1957 provides that unless claim is made within eighteen
months "from the date of the accident" the claim is completely barred) ; MiNN.
STAT. ANr. . 176.151 (Supp. 1958) (not to exceed six years from the date of the
accident); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 92-601 (1949) (twelve months from the
date of the "happening of the accident") ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 281:16 (Supp.
1957) (ninety days from the occurrence of the accident); N.J. REv. STAT. .
34:15-51 (1959) (two years after the accident); N.M. STAT. ANN. . 59-10-74
(Supp. 1957) (one year after the accident "causing injury") ; N.Y. WORxME-N'S
ComP. LAW § 28 (two years after the accident); N.C. GEN. STAT. . 97-24(a)(1958) (two years after the accident): ORE. REV. STAT. § 656.274 (1955) (not
later than one year after the accident): PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77. . 602 (Supp.
1957) (sixteen months after the accident) ; S.C, CODE § 72-303 (1952) (one year
19591
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twenty-four date it from the time of the "injury.", In at least one of
the "accident" type statutes9 there are provisions which soften the
effect somewhat in the case of latent or inherently unknowable injury
caused by accident. Massachusetts,'" Texas," and Nevada 12 appear at
first glance to have "accident" type statutes using the accident as a
beginning point for the limitation period; but in each statute there
are such broad grounds of excuse for "good cause," "mistake," and the
like, that they are for all practical purposes in accord with the better
rule that dates the limitation period from the time of the "injury."13
Although there has been some legislative amendment equating "injury"
with "accident,"' 14 and, indeed, some successful judicial activity to that
effect even under an "injury" type statute,15 there would appear to be
after the accident); UTAHI CODE ANN. § 35-1-99 (1953) (three years from the
date of the accident); VA. CODE ANN. § 65-84 (1950) (one year after the ac-
cident) ; Wis. STAT. § 102.01(2) (1957) (limitation period starts on "date of the
injury," but "date of the injury" is defined as the "date of the accident"). It
should be pointed out that these provi-ions relate only to claims for accidental
injury. If the claim is based on accidental death the limitation periods invariably
begin on the death and not at the time of the accident.
A=z. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1061 (1956) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.19 (1952);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 85-26 (1949) ; MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.165 (Supp. 1957) ; Miss.
CODE ANN. § 6998-18 (1952) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.430 (1949) ; N.D. Rlv. CODE§ 65-0501 (1943); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.84 (1953) OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 85, § 43 (1951); MI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-35-57 (1956) (two years after
the "occurrence or manifestation of the injury"); S.D. CODE § 64.0611 (1939)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1003 (1955); WASH. REv. CODE § 51.28.050 (1952);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2540 (1955) ; Wyo. Coup. STAT. ANN. § 72-160 (Supp. 1957).
' LA. REv. STAT. § 23:1209 (1950): "[W]here the injury does not result at
the time of, or develop immediately after the accident, the limitation shall not take
effect until the expiration of one year from the time the injury develops, but in all
such cases the claim for payment shall be forever barred unless the proceedings
have been begun within tvo years from the date of the accident." Despite the
provision for latent injuries, the claim still must be filed Within two years after
the date of the accident. See MALONE, LA. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 77(Supp. 1955).
0 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 49 (1957) provides that failure to make claim
Within the prescribed six months after the "occurrence of the injury" will not
bar proceedings for compensation if the late filing was occasioned by "mistake
or other reasonable cause, or if it is found that the insurer was not prejudiced by
the delay."
I TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1956) provides in part: "For
good cause, the Board may, in meritorious cases, waive the strict compliance with
the foregoing limitations as to notice, and the filing of claims before the Board."
1NEv. Rrv. STAT. § 616.500(6) (1957) also allows the Nevada Industrial
Commission to waive the strict claim requirement where "for some sufficient
reason" the claim could not have been made.122 LARSEN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 78.42(a) (1952).
" CAL. LAB. CODE § 5411 provides: "The date of the injury, except in cases of
occupational disease, is that date during the employment on which occurred the
alleged incident or exposure, for the consequences of which compensation is
laimed." Similarly, Wis. STAT. § 102.01(2) (1957) defines the "date of the
injury as th date ofteacdn. 
Sent 
rpa
T -Graham v. a5. W.; Wells Brick Co., 150 Tenn. 60 26 SW. 770 (1924).The court stated that " While the terms ' acc ident' and 'ij ury are not synonymous,
the accident produced the injury and inpoint of time they w ere concurrent. ETihe
legisla t a t'ture t. u tti .. fxed he date of the inj r a  the date of te accident and not at
some remote time thereafter when the injured employee became definitely satisfied
that he was disabled as a result of the accident." 150 Tenn. at 667, 266 S.W. at
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overwhelming judicial agreement that under a limitation period dating
from the time of the "injury" no claim for compensation- arises until the
injury results in disability, or in some other overt manner becomes ap-
parent to the claimant. 16
It is submitted that the harsh result indicated under an "accident"
type statute like North Carolina's is the product of a failure to keep in
mind the benevolent purposes of workmen's compensation legislation,
and to a reluctance to interpret the "claim" for compensation in latent
injury cases so as to effectuate those purposes. To say that the limita-
tion period begins to run from the time of the "accident" and not from
the time of some compensable injury is to say in those cases where the
accident and the injury are not coeval that it begins to run before a claim
or a cause of action has really accrued.17 In common law negligence
cases, of course, the cause of action for damages for personal injuries
accrues from the time the negligence operates harmfully on the plaintiff,
that is, at the time of the accident, and usually the plaintiff's knowledge
that any of his rights have been violated is deemed immaterial.' 8 But
in workmen's compensation the right to compensation is predicated not
on negligence but on the sound policy that the expense of industrial
injury, however faultlessly incurred, should be distributed to the public
772. The case in effect was overruled, however, in Ogle v. Tenn, Eastman Corp.,
185 Tenn. 527, 206 S.W.2d 909 (1947) and it may be safely said that today
Tennessee is an "injury" jurisdiction. An interesting example of judicial vacilla-
tion on the "accident" versus "injUry" problem is to be found in the Oklahoma
cases. In Brown & Root, Inc. v. Dunkelberger, 196 Okla. 116, 162 P.2d 1018(1945), the Oklahoma court had held that the statute of limitations did not begin
to run against the filing of a claim for compensation until the disability arising
from the injury became apparent to the employee. Three years later, however,
in Tulsa Hotel v. Sparks, 200 Okla. 636, 198 P.2d 652 (1948) the Oklahoma
court adopted a strict construction policy and in effect overruled the salutary
holding of the Dunkelberger case.
" Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 510, 74 P.2d 657 (1937).
This decision reversed a line of cases based on Utah Consol. Mining Co. v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 279, 194 Pac. 657 (1920), which had applied a general
statute of limitations and dated it from the accident. (Regrettably, however,
the sound holding of the Salt Lake City case is now itself legislatively overruled
by an amendment to the Utah compensation statute which dates the period from
the time of the accident. UTAr CODE ANN. § 35-1-99 (1953). Applying the new
amendment, the Utah court in McKee v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 550, 206
•P.2d 715 (1949) said that the claimant's right to compensation was forever barred
notwithstanding the fact that he obtained no competent medical diagnosis of
his work-caused injury until three years after the accident and had no knowledge
of his latent condition until that time.)
17 Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, note 16 supra, at 513, 74 P.2d at 658.
18 Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957) ; Butler v. Bell, 181
N.C. 85, 106 S.E. 217 (1921). But see Saffold v. Scarborough, 91 Ga. App. 628,
86 S.E.2d 649 (1955), to the effect that the general rule in negligence cases that
the cause of action accrues and that the statute of limitations runs from the
moment of injurious impact should not apply to that type of negligence case
involving inherently unknowable harm. The Georgia court said that in such a
case the statute of limitations should not begin to run until the plaintiff had reason
to know he had a cause of action. Cf. Bradt v. United States, 221 F.2d 325 (2d
Cir. 1955).
1959]
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as a cost of production.19 Consequently, the negligence rules are in-
applicable to workmen's compensation legislation. As the Utah court
said in Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n :20
The compensation act . . . imposes a duty on employers to
pay compensation to employees who suffer disability or loss from
an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of employ-
ment. Not until there is an accident and injury and disability or
loss from the injury does the duty to pay arise. A mere accident
does not impose the duty to pay. Accident plus injury therefrom
does not impose the duty to pay. But accident plus injury which
results in disability or loss gives rise to the duty to pay.
(Emphasis added. )
To be compared with the Utah court's cogent analysis of the nature
of a claim for compensation made in an "injury" jurisdiction is that of
the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Lewis v. Carnegie-
Illinois Steel Corp.21 There a solution of muriatic acid and water was
accidentally splashed into the employee's eye, but no serious injury
or disability resulted until more than four years later when the claimant
lost the sight of the eye as a direct result of the original accident.
Applying a one year period of limitation dating from the time of the
accident, and holding the claim barred, the court made this curious
statement:
A claim for personal injury arises simultaneously and is
complete with the happening of the accident .... The statutory
limitation .. . applies to the cause of action (the splashing of
muriatic acid into the left eye) and not to the extent of the injury
(the loss of sight of that eye) .22
It would doubtless come as a surprise to many workmen and em-
ployers in Pennsylvania to learn that upon the occurrence of any accident
in the course of employment, however minor and however devoid of
any disabling injury, there should exist a "cause of action" for work-
men's compensation. The effect of such a strict interpretation of the
limitation period for filing claims is to lift the latent injury case out of
a statute that was intended to compensate workmen for injuries re-
sulting in a loss of wages and to protect the public from the expense of
providing for their care.23
The latent injury, traceable to a specific traumatic event which is
isolable in point of time, is factually distinguishable from the similarly
troublesome occupational disease which results slowly over a relatively
19 Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co.. 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 178 (1951).20 93 Utah 510, 513, 74 P.2d 657, 658 (1937).
'1 159 Pa. Super. 226, 48 A.2d 120 (1946).
2 Id. at 228, 48 A.2d at 121.
2' Baltimore Steel Co. v. Burch, 187 Md. 209, 49 A.2d 542 (1946).
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long period of time because of repeated exposure to a particular hazard.24
The factual distinction is exemplified in the hernia cases. If the hernia
follows as a result of a single definite "accident" it is an "accidental
hernia," whereas if it develops as a result of certain types of lifting over
a long period of time it may be an "occupational hernia." But aside
from the factual difference, there would seem to be little difference in
legal principle. The Maryland court,25 in construing a "date of the
disability" limitation provision applicable both to occupational diseases
and to accidental injuries, said that in the case of occupational disease the
statute of limitations would begin to run "from the time the employee
...knew or had reason to believe that he was suffering from an oc-
cupational disease and that there was a causal connection between his
disability and occupation."2 6  The same court used much the same
reasoning in an accidental injury case,27 saying that in such event the
limitation period does not begin to run until "it becomes or should be-
come reasonably apparent to a workman that he has a compensable
disability." 28  The point is that the legislatures and courts have come
to recognize the inherently unknowable character of the occupational
disease in its earlier stages, and generally rather liberal claim periods
for that category of disability have been provided. 29 Even in many of
those jurisdictions where the limitation period on accidental injuries
dates from the time of the accident, there are to be found separate
provisions allowing claims for occupational disease to be filed within a
certain period after "disability," "first symptom," "diagnosis," "manifes-
tation," etc.30 For example, G.S. § 97-58 provides that claims for oc-
cupational disease may be filed within one year from "death, disability,
or disablement, as the case may be."31 The North Carolina Supreme
Court, in construing this section, has said that the legislature did
not intend to require employees suffering from compensable occupa-
24 Rathien v. Industrial Comm'n, 233 Wis. 452, 289 N.W. 618 (1940).
" Consolidation Coal Co. v. Porter, 192 Md. 494, 64 A.2d 715 (1949).
"Id. at 506, 64 A.2d at 721.
'7 Gracie v. Koppers Co., 213 Md. 109, 130 A.2d 754 (1957).
"Id. at 114, 130 A.2d at 757.
See generally, 100 C.J.S., Workmen's Comzpenation § 468 (8)b (1958).
"Compare VA. CoDE ANN. § 65-84 (1950), requiring that a claim for an
accidental injury be filed with the Commission within one year after the accident,
with VA. CoDE ANN. § 65-49 (Supp. 1958), allowing a claim for occupational
disease to be filed within one year after the claimant experiences a distinct mani-
festation, or a diagnosis is made, whichever shall first occur, of an occupational
disease.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58 (a) (1958). The term "disability" is defined as an
incapacity to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of
the injury in the same or any other employment. G.S. § 97-2(i). The term
"disablement" as it is applied to cases of asbestosis and silicosis means the actual
incapacitation by either disease to earn the wages which the employee was
receiving "at the time of his last injurious exposure to asbestosis or silicosis, but
in all other cases of occupational disease 'disablement' shall be equivalent to
'disability'.. . ." G.S. § 97-54.
19591
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tional disease to diagnose their own condition, or to file a claim for
compensation before they know they have such a disease or run the risk
of having their claim barred by the statute of limitations.3 2  The
operative factors in a claim for compensation based on an occupational
disease in North Carolina, therefore, are disability and an awareness
of the incidence of the particular disease. The employee suffering from
an occupational disease8 3 does not stand the risk of losing his right to
compensation until he knows or has reason to know that he actually
suffers from the disease. But the employee who sustains a latent or
progressive injury in an industrial accident, an injury as inherently
insidious in many instances as an occupational disease, stands to lose
forever his right to compensation unless the injury becomes apparent
within two years after the accident. It is submitted that notwithstanding
the factual distinction between occupational disease and accidental in-
jury in their inception, their development is essentially the same, and
the same legal principles should apply. For in either event no amount
of diligence on the part of the employee would avail until his condition
became manifest.
The purpose of a limitation period on filing claims for compensation
is the same as for any other statute of limitations: to protect the person
to be charged from stale or fraudulent claims that are too old or too
doubtful to be successfully investigated and defended.8 4 It has been
argued that if an employer is to be open to claims filed several years
after the occurrence of the accident the very purpose of the limitation
period will be defeated.35  The argument may be simply illustrated.
An employee is involved in an accident in the course of his employment
and experiences a slight twinge of pain in the back. But if there is
any serious injury he is completely unaware of it. Then months or
even years later while working around his house he lifts a heavy bag of
cement and "slips" a disc. The workman remembers the employment-
connected accident but no one else does. To answer the argument, it
may be pointed out that there are actually two distinct limitation periods
in most statutes8 0 with which the employee must comply: The first is
the period for giving -notice of the accident to the employer, and the
second is the period for filing claim with the particular agency or court
for compensation. G.S. § 97-22 requires that written notice of the
accident be given to the employer within thirty days after its occurrence,
" Huskins v. United Feldspar Corp., 241 N.C. 128, 84 S.E.2d 645 (1954);
Duncan v. Carpenter, 233 N.C. 422, 64 S.E.2d 410 (1951).
" See N.C. GEx. STAT. § 97-53 (1958) where the compensable occupational
diseases are enumerated.
"Butler v. Bell, 181 N.C. 85, 106 S.E. 217 (1921); Harris v. Traders & Gen.
Ins. Co., 200 La. 445, 8 So. 2d 289 (1942). See 1 Woon, LIMiTATIONS OF AcTioNs
§ 4 4th ed. 1916).
See 2 LARSEN, op. cit. supra note 13, § 78.42(b).
HoRovITZ, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 247 (1944).
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unless reasonable excuse for late notice is made to the satisfaction of
the Industrial Commission.37 The notice provision should certainly
give the employer sufficient protection with respect to investigating the
facts of the accident, minimizing the degree of the injury, and soliciting
the statements of witnesses. And furthermore the "doubtful claim"
argument has been satisfactorily met by Professor Larsen who points
out that in any event the claimant must still prove his case, including
the "arising out of" requirement and the exercise of due care in discover-
ing the nature of his disability.38 The ultimate question is whether the
procedural purposes to be served by the "accident" type statute are
so necessary as to justify their defeating a piece of purportedly protec-
tive and remedial legislation.
As the courts are too prone to apply the limitation provision under
an "accident" statute by its strict letter, the obvious remedy lies with
the legislature, although an occasional court will acknowledge that
"justice and fairness" speak for a contrary conclusion.3 9 However, at
least one court4" has assumed the task of carrying over into the adjective
17 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-22 (1958). The "reasonable excuse" provision permits
the excuse of waiver, or estoppel in not notifying the employer of the accident
within the prescribed time. Yet the North Carolina court speaks of the limita-
tion period for filing a claim for compensation as a condition precedent to the
substantive right to receive compensation, and asserts that it is not an "ordinary"
Statute of Limitations. Winslow v. Carolina Conference Ass'n, 211 N.C. 571,
191 S.E. 403 (1937). If that is true, there should be no question of waiver of the de-
fense of late filing, or estoppel to assert it, or even fraud in causing the late filing,
since the limitation period, if a condition precedent, would limit the liability and not
the rentedy, in which case it could not be construed on equitable considerations as
analogous to waiver and estoppel. Simons v. Halcomb, 98 Conn. 770, 120
Atl. 510 (1923). Notwithstanding the North Carolina courts assertion that
the limitation period is a condition precedent, and even jurisdictional to the
right of the Commission to hear a claim, Wray v. Carolina Cotton & Woolen
Mills Co., 205 N.C. 782, 172 S.E. 487 (1934), in other cases involving the claim
period question the court has stated that, "It must not be understood that we
hold an employer may not by his conduct w.aive the filing of a claim within the
time required by law. The law of estoppel applies in compensation proceedings as
in all other cases." Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 75 S.E.2d 777(1953). An allied problem, to which the same general principles of this comment
relate, is that of a recurrence of an injury or a change of condition. G.S. § 97-47
provides that the Commission may review an award and on such review make
an award ending, diminishing, or increasing the compensation previously awarded,
but no such review can be made after twelve months from the date of the last
payment of compensation. Medical or other treatment bills paid by the em-
ployer are treated as payments of compensation for the purposes of this section
only. It has no relation to the filing of original claims under G.S. § 97-24(a).
Payment of medical bills as allowed by G.S. § 97-25 (for the purpose of dimin-
ishing the severity of an injury) ivill not have the effect of an admission of liability
by the employer or constitute a waiver of the necessity of filing timely claim
with the Commission. Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., supra.
"s2 LAitSEx, op. cit. supra note 13, § 78.42(b).
" Bergstrom v. O'Brien Sheet Metal Co., 251 Minn. 32, 86 N.W.2d 82 (1957).
This was also recognized by Mr. Justice Denny in the Whitted case. "It may be
regretted that we have no provision in our Workmen's Compensation Act to
preserve and protect the rights of employees in cases like the one before us."
Whitted v. Palmer-Bee Co., 228 N.C. 447 at 453, 46 S.E.2d 109 at 113 (1948).
"Keenan v. Consumers Public Power Dist., 152 Neb. 54, 40 N.W.2d 261
(1949).
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law of workmen's compensation the beneficent qualities of the substan-
tive, and has realized that the purposes of legislation involving a whole
new area of claims and liabilities cannot be effectuated by a rigid in-
terpretation of every word. The Nebraska court, faced with a latent
injury problem and a straight "accident" type statute, held that the
"literal limitation of the statute has no application where the injury is
latent and progressive and the employee is without knowledge of the
condition." 4 1  The court said that in such a case the action for com-
pensation could be brought within one year from the time the claimant
obtained knowledge of his condition.
An interpretation of a straight "accident" type statute as running
from the time the employee knew or ought to have known that he had a
compensable injury can be supported on various grounds. 42 In the first
place, it could hardly be presumed that the legislature intended to de-
feat the purpose of the act by setting up a virtually impossible claim
requirement in the case of latent injury, and certainly to the extent
that meritorious claims are not awarded the purpose of the act is
thwarted.48  Further, the claim period section should be construed in
such a way as to meet the typical coverage formula of "injury by
accident, arising out of and in the course of employment." 44  Since an
injury is certainly as important to the coverage formula as an accident,
the word "accident" in the claim period section could be construed as
meaning "accidental injury." Professor Larsen advocates this sensible
construction, pointing out that an "accidental injury" is the very heart
of the coverage formula.45  Finally, the constitutionality of legislation
that at once destroys common law rights for personal injuries sustained
during the course of employment and prevents the right to compensation
by a procedural road block such as an "accident" type limitation pro-
vision has been questioned,46 especially if in the particular jurisdiction
there exists a state constitutional provision, as in North Carolina, that
purports to assure a legal remedy for every injury.47  While the latter
"
1Id. at 57, 40 N.W.2d at 263.
42 See, e.g., Austin, Essay on Interpretation, in 2 JURISPRUDENCE 989 (5th ed.
1885). "Where a statute is remedial, and so entitled to a liberal construction,
judicial extensive interpretation has always been recognized as genuine interpreta-
tion." (Emphasis added.)
'
3 Mulhall v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 80 N.H. 194, 115 Atl. 449 (1921).
"As to the coverage formula, see Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428, 53 S.E.2d
668 (1949). Cf. Griffitts v. Humphrey, 199 Tenn. 528, 288 S.W.2d 1 (1955),
expressly adopting the language of Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah
510, 74 P.2d 657 (1937) which is set out in the text at note 20 supra.
" 2 LARSEN, op. cit. supra note 13, § 78.42(d).
,6 Ibid.
" N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 35: "All courts shall be open; and every person for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law ... ." As to the enactment of statutes in other jurisdictions
abolishing civil actions for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction,
and breach of promise to marry, see, generally I VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAws § 6 (1935). The constitutionality of such statutes generally has been
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argument has considerable merit, it overlooks the fact that workmen's
compensation is not predicated on negligence or any other historically
actionable wrong, but creates a whole new statutory area of claims and
liabilities that were non-existent at the common law. If it happened
that in any particular case the accidental injury was caused by the
negligence of the employer, denial of a remedy by way of the procedural
bar might well violate such a constitutional guaranty.
The North Carolina court will presumably adhere to its strict con-
struction policy, however, and if relief is to be had from the present
straight "accident" type statute the General Assembly will probably
have to provide it. The 1955 amendment, enlarging the claim period
from one to two years after the accident, would at least prevent the
harsh result of the Whitted case on its particular facts. But it is
respectfully submitted that the claim period provision should be amended
as follows:
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-24(a).--"The right to compensation under
this article shall be barred unless a claim is filed with the Industrial
Commission within two years from the date the employee knew or
ought to have known the nature of his injury and its relation to the
employment. If death results from such injury, claim must be filed
with the Commission within one year after the death."
DONALD L. HARDISON
upheld on the ground that the marriage contract results in a special relation
created by the state, and thus subject to the state's control. Fearon v. Treanor,
272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E.2d 815 (1936), rehearing denied 273 N.Y. 528, 7 N.E.2d
677, appeal dismissed 301 U.S. 667, rehearing denied 302 U.S. 774 (1937).
1959]
